If you asked the people of Ireland what plan they would accept, by an emphatic majority, they would say ‘We want independence and an Irish Republic.’ There is absolutely no doubt about that. The elected representatives of Ireland, now by a clear majority, have declared in favor of independence.
Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, March 1920
The FIRST DÁIL ÉIREANN 1919
On January 21, 1919, the Irish National Assembly, Dáil Éireann, declared Ireland's independence to the world. January 21st, therefore, should be as well known a date in Ireland as July 4th is in America. But if you've missed the annual fireworks and celebrations from Dublin, you haven't been alone. In fact, January 21st doesn't even merit a bank holiday from the Dublin government, let alone a national celebration. With the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Dáil upon us, it is worth considering why this date does not receive the recognition it deserves. It is also an appropriate time to consider what steps can be taken to mobilize the Irish people to reassert their democratic right to national self-determination. Certainly, that mobilization is needed if the All Ireland Republic that so many Irish women and men sacrificed to bring into being in January 1919 is to be made a living reality today.
But first we should consider why, some hundred years after the Irish people voted for complete independence, Britain still claims jurisdiction over a portion of Ireland. After all, if even British Prime Minister Lloyd George could see that an “emphatic majority” of the people of Ireland wanted independence from British rule, why didn’t the Declaration of Irish Independence end the era of British interference in Ireland? The short answer is because Britain did not accept the democratic wishes of the Irish people. The Irish people were overwhelmingly in favor of complete independence for Ireland and overwhelmingly opposed to the partition of their country. Britain’s suppression of the Irish Republic and partition of Ireland was against the clear wishes of the Irish people. Although the mind-set that underlay partition should be anathema to modern Irish men and women, partition remains in place today. The historic roots of partition are now seldom ever raised or discussed. This is all the more remarkable, as Ireland, of course, is still living with the legacy of partition. It is part of the current reality of life in Ireland, despite the fact that an emphatic majority of the people of Ireland wished it to be otherwise.
The watershed General Election of November 1918 was the first in the post-World War era. It was also the first held under an expanded franchise that abolished almost all property qualifications for men and enfranchised women over 30 who met certain property qualifications. Sinn Féin, the Irish separatist party, ran on a platform of sovereign independence and an Irish Republic. It promised to withdraw Irish representation from the British Parliament and to make use of any and every means available to make British rule in Ireland impossible. The Irish independence activists ran their election campaign under great difficulties. Many of the separatist leaders were in jail, a great part of Ireland was under British military rule, Sinn Féin itself and other national organizations were banned, all Republican papers had been suppressed and every newspaper in the country was under British censorship control. The whole electoral machinery, in fact, was under British control. Incredibly, however, despite all these obstacles, the General Election resulted in Sinn Féin winning 73 out of 105 Irish seats. Not coincidentally, it was the last time Britain allowed an all-Ireland vote in a General Election. But, true to their election promise, instead of sitting in a British parliament, the elected representatives of the Irish people met in Dublin on January 21, 1919 as the National Assembly of Ireland, Dáil Éireann.
January 21, 1919 is therefore the date of Irish National Independence. The Rising in Dublin of Easter 1916 of course was the catalyst, but it took 2 1/2 more years of hard work---campaigns for the release of Easter Week prisoners, reorganization of both the Irish Volunteers and Sinn Féin under the leadership of Éamonn De Valera, and, most importantly, publicity and popular agitation around the anti-Conscription Movement---to change the national climate. It was Nollaig Ó Gadhra who made the point that if Easter Week did nothing else, it staunched the flow of Irish recruits into the British Army and onto the bloody battlefields of the Western Front. This was one of the great, unappreciated achievements of Easter Week.
This, in turn, led the British War Government to consider conscription in Ireland. It was this threat, more than anything else, that made the bulk of the Irish people receptive to the separatist message and made the November 1918 Election vote outcome possible. Revisionists who seek to downplay the scope of the mandate for Irish independence seem to forget the fact that there had never, at any time, been democratic consent, let alone any democratic mandate, from the Irish people in favor of Union with Britain.
The separatists did invite all elected Irish parliament members, including Unionists, to the opening assembly of Dáil Éireann at Mansion House, Dublin. In the event, both Unionist and Irish Parliamentary Party members boycotted the Assembly. In addition, 36 of the Dáil members (Teachtaí Dálai [TDs]) were listed as "fé ghlas ag Gallaibh" ("captive by the foreigner") and 4 were listed as "ar dhíbirt an Gallaibh" ("banished by the foreigner," i.e. on the run). Those “fé ghlas ag Gallaibh” included of course Éamonn De Valera, who was still in Lincoln Prison in Britain. Cathal Brugha therefore was nominated as Ceann Comhairle (Chairman) to preside over the Assembly.
Brugha was one of the legendary heroes of Easter Week. He was so badly wounded in the battle that it was assumed he would die of his many wounds, but he survived and was instrumental in the rebuilding of the Irish Volunteers after Easter Week. At the Volunteers Convention held in November 1917, De Valera had been elected as President of the Volunteers and Brugha became Chief of Staff. In April 1919 De Valera, back in Ireland after his escape from an English prison, was elected President of the Dáil Council of Ministers. Brugha then took over as Minister of Defense for the Republican Government of Dáil Éireann from Richard Mulcahy who himself became Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, or, as it should at this point be properly known, the Irish Republican Army. Brugha would remain Minister of Defense throughout the War of Independence and the Truce Period. As such he was, in military matters, Michael Collins's superior, although Collins garnered most of the attention.
It was, therefore, Cathal Brugha who read the Dearbhu Neamhspleáchais (Declaration of 
Independence) in Irish as the Dáil members stood at attention. Then in proper cosmopolitan style, TD George Gavan O Duffy rose and read the Declaration in French, the language, as Nollaig Ó Gadhra frequently observed, of international diplomacy of the day. Only then was the Declaration read in English. This order, of course, was no accident. The Gaelic revival movement, the movement to reestablish Irish as an everyday language of the country, was at the heart of the Irish national resurgence. Most of the Dáil session, in fact, was conducted 'as Gaeilge'. Unfortunately, as Nollaig would also note, never again would Irish predominate over English at a Dáil session. When the readings were done, Brugha told the assembled TDs, in Irish, that "you understand in what is asserted now that we are done with England."
In an acknowledgment of the role that labor played in the Irish struggle, the Dáil read and adopted the Democratic Program, which was founded in part on the Easter Week Proclamation. The Program declared that "we desire our country to be ruled in accordance with the principles of Liberty, Equality and Justice for all." It also declared the right of every citizen to an adequate share of the fruits of the nation's labor. It proclaimed the first duty of the government to provide for children, including their proper education; it called for the abolition of the poor-law system and for increased productivity and reinvigoration of native industry.
The session lasted two hours and was judged by foreign observers to have been orderly and dignified. Irish historian Dorothy Macardle judged them "two of the most momentous hours in Ireland's history." Another event that same day would underscore the significance of what took place at Mansion House. In Soloheadbeg, County Tipperary, a group of Volunteers ambushed a cart of explosives that was under armed Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) guard. The two R.I.C. men were called on to surrender but instead took aim and were themselves killed. Taken together, the opening of Dáil Éireann and the Soloheadbeg Ambush mark the start of the Irish War of Independence. Sometimes known as the Tan War (in reference to the uniforms of the British Black and Tan units), it lasted from January 1919 until the Truce of July 1921.
The Tan War was punctuated by a series of violent and spectacular events: raids, ambushes, reprisals, assassinations, prison breaks, and hunger strikes. The War had a huge impact on the populace and has been a source of countless ballads, legends, and local lore. But there was also something else going on in 
this period: an attempt to develop an Irish national government, Dáil Éireann, in direct challenge to the British Administration. That An Dáil was able to accomplish this, even on a sometimes-limited basis, was an amazing achievement given the fact that Ireland was in the midst of war and military occupation. The Dáil government, in fact, was eventually able to supplant the British Government machinery in parts of Ireland, particularly in Munster and Connacht. For example, the Dáil established a Department of Local Government that was able to obtain the allegiance of local government and public health services in a large part of the country. The Dáil Labor Ministry arbitrated labor disputes. A Justice Ministry under Austin Stack appointed judges and established Republican courts. Lord Monteagle, a member of the landlord class in Ireland, wrote in The Irish Times during the period that the "Sinn Fein courts are steadily extending their jurisdiction and dispensing justice even-handed between man and man, Catholic and Protestant, farmer and shopkeeper, grazier and cattle driver, landlord and tenant."
The Dáil even set up a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had missions in Paris, London, the 
U.S., and Rome. Dáil representatives also maintained relationships with Egyptian and Indian anti-imperialist movements. A campaign to raise money for the independence struggle via the Dáil loan was very successful. De Valera, in fact, spent much of the time in the U.S. raising money from Irish America and working to gain recognition of the Republican Government. The Dáil also subsidized the American tour of others, such as Mary MacSwiney, sister of Terence MacSwiney, the martyred Mayor of Cork, to raise money and educate Americans about conditions in Ireland.
There were, however, tensions between Irish-Americans and the Irish representatives of the Dáil Government. Some leading Irish-Americans such as John Devoy of Clan na Gael and Judge Cohalan of Friends of Irish Freedom (F.O.I.F.) focused much of their resources and energy on American issues, especially fighting U.S. President Wilson over the establishment of a League of Nations. De Valera, however, insisted that there was now an Irish Republican Government and, therefore, money raised in the 
U.S. for the Irish Cause should be used where it was most needed, in Ireland, and should be controlled by the Republican Government. Eventually De Valera and the Republican envoy from Ireland, Harry Boland, had to set up a new organization, the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic (A.A.R.I.R.), to act in closer harmony with Ireland’s elected Republican Government, Dáil Éireann. Joe McGarrity, originally from Tyrone but based in Philadelphia, formed a Reorganized Clan na Gael to provide support for Dáil Éireann. Some of the conflict was over issues and principles; some no doubt was exacerbated by personality conflicts. Devoy, for example, originally spoke out in opposition to the Treaty until he found out that DeValera was leading the Anti-Treatyites. Devoy then led his faction of Clan na Gael in support of the Treaty and the Free State as did Cohalan with the F.O.I.F. McGarrity and the A.A.R.I.R., in contrast, stood by the Republican Cause in the Treaty debates and the subsequent Civil War. There is no doubt that these clashes and divisions by supporters of Irish freedom in America weakened their effectiveness in terms of promoting the Irish Cause.
Back in Ireland, the Irish themselves were demonstrating to skeptics at home, and to the world at large, that they had the capacity to govern themselves in the most difficult of situations brought on by the British occupation. They were able to accomplish this by relying on a new generation of Irishmen and 
Irishwomen. Th e Irish independence movement opened up opportunities for women, in particular, to come to the fore. The Dáil-sponsored courts, for example, gave an opportunity to women to actively participate in the new justice system. Women sometimes presided over the local parish courts. The excellent Ken Loach film about the period, The Wind That Shakes the Barley, dramatized scenes of the Republican courts functioning and the role that women and young people played in the struggle. Women were also present at the upper reaches of the National Movement at this time. In April 1919 Countess Markievicz was appointed Dáil Minister for Labor---the first woman cabinet minister in Western Europe. Women such as Mary MacSwiney, Sighle Humphries, Kathleen Lynn, Dorothy Macardle, Maire Comerford, and Hanna Sheehy Skeffington played valuable roles in this era. Many had already been involved in the freedom struggle as activists in the suffragette movement.
Cumann na mBan, the Women’s Republican organization, had started out as an auxiliary force for the Volunteers but developed a leadership and mission of its own. During the Tan War, Cumann na mBan members were involved in all aspects of the struggle, from delivering messages, gathering intelligence, fund-raising, and arms smuggling to publicity and propaganda. Then, as now, there was some backlash to the active role taken by women in the national affairs by more reactionary elements of society. Much chauvinism and misogyny was directed at Cumann na mBan when it came out strongly against the Treaty proposed by Britain. In fact, the Anti-Treatyites were sometimes derisively called the “Women and Childers (as in Republican publicist Erskine Childers) Party” by those trying to marginalize Republicans during the Civil War period. The problem of men at the highest levels of political power showing contempt for women is, as we have seen, still with us. For its part, once it supplanted the Republic, the Irish Free State showed its ingratitude to the role women played in the national struggle by imposing restrictions on women’s rights, for example the elimination of women from jury pools and restrictions on women taking certain civil service exams. Hanna Sheehy Skeffington had said of the Easter Rising that it was “the only instance I know of in history where men fighting for freedom voluntarily included women.” Once the Treaty came into operation, however, the prospect of women taking their rightful place alongside men in Irish public life was cast aside.
The young men of Ireland who fought during the War of Independence did so under the banner of the Irish Republic. During the War, the relationship between An Dáil and the Irish Volunteers (Óglaigh na hÉireann in Irish) was complicated. Óglaigh na hÉireann started out as a voluntary military organization "founded to secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland without distinction of creed, class or politics." It elected its own officers and was governed by its own Executive. The Dáil was based in Dublin, but much of the fighting took place away in the countryside, especially in Munster, and in West Cork in particular. Lines of command and communication between an underground government and a voluntary decentralized guerilla movement were hard to establish and maintain. In April 1919 De Valera had said that the Minister of National Defense (Brugha) is in "close association with the voluntary military forces which are the foundation of the National Army."
This, of course, was not a formulation sufficient to ensure clear lines of responsibility and accountability for a military force acting on behalf of the Irish people. In August 1919 Cathal Brugha proposed that every member of the Dáil and all I.R.A. Volunteers swear allegiance to "the Irish Republic and the Government of the Irish Republic, which is Dáil Éireann....” After a brief debate, the Dáil approved the new oath. The proposal to have the I.R.A. swear allegiance to the Republic and the Dáil, however, meet with some resistance. Collins and other Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.) members maintained that the simple Volunteer oath to the Republic was enough. Traditionally the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. had considered itself the "sole government of the Irish Republic." Several leading members of the Dáil Government---de Valera, Brugha, and Austin Stack---had no longer involved themselves in the I.R.B. after the Easter Rising. De Valera felt that a secret oath-bound organization such as the I.R.B. was no longer necessary or desirable, especially since a democratic Republican government had been established and was functioning. Collins, though, was the leader of the I.R.B. and as much of his power and influence was derived from that position as from his official roles as head of I.R.A. intelligence and Dáil Minister of Finance.
In March 1921, De Valera, in an attempt to clarify the relationship of the I.R.A. with the Dáil Government, stated that "from the Irish Volunteers we fashioned the Irish Republican Army to be the military arm of the Government. The army, is, therefore, a regular State force, under the civil control of the elected representatives .... The Government is, therefore, responsible for the actions of this army. It is the national army of defense." Proper civilian control over the military, however, was not fully established. In September 1921, during the Truce period, Cathal Brugha pushed for a reorganization and recommissioning of the Irish Republican Army in order to "put the Army in an unequivocal position as the legal defense force of the Nation, under the control of the Civil Government." The I.R.B. group at Army G.H.Q., however, delayed the matter and by then the Treaty had been signed and Civil War was on the horizon. There is some irony, therefore, when later, during the Civil War, it was Collins and other I.R.B. members who were cast as defenders of democratic civilian control over the military in contrast to the Anti-Treaty forces. It was, in fact, de Valera, Brugha, and Stack, all subsequent Anti-Treatyites, who pushed during the Tan War to have the I.R.A. firmly under the control of the elected representatives of the Dáil.
During the Tan War, the I.R.A. was the Army of the Republic. It had the legal and democratic authority of Dáil Éireann as the Government of the Republic behind it. It was the British Government that was now properly viewed as illegitimate. When Terence MacSwiney, the Mayor of Cork, was captured by the British he simply declared that he, MacSwiney, was the chief magistrate of Cork and that the British court was il
legal. Those who took part in it were liable to arrest under the laws of the Irish Republic. The Volunteers had power and legitimacy derived from the democratic will of the people and this was crucial. The Volunteers, moreover, fought bravely and resourcefully against astonishing odds. Young men, often from humble backgrounds and with little education, came from farms and small towns throughout Ireland and took on, with little training and poor weaponry, the most professional, well-armed, and well-trained army in the world up to that time. There was, moreover, great bravery shown by the ordinary Irish civilians in providing safe houses, organizing fund-raisers, participating in the Dáil court system, etc., at a time when it could mean risking your livelihood, your freedom, and quite possibly your life. Certainly, if courage and dedication in pursuance of a just cause were the measure, the Irish people earned the right to celebrate January 21st as their Independence Day. But the British did not care about just causes. What concerned them was that they had superior military might to impose their will on Ireland.
The British Government quickly made clear that it would not respect democratic principles when it came to Ireland. In September 1919, it banned Dáil Éireann. The I.R.A. guerilla campaign, in fact, did not really heat up until after the Dáil was “outlawed” by the British Government. It is remarkable, therefore, that this fateful event in Irish history, the decision by the British Government to “outlaw” a democratically elected government and to enforce that suppression by force and violence, is not centrally featured in discussions 
of the conflict. Many history books do not even mention this decision by the British Government or do so in only cursory fashion. And yet there is probably no decision that was more consequential in terms of future Anglo-Irish “Troubles” than this decision taken by the British in September 1919. The British could have accepted Irish democracy and worked to repair relations between Britain and Ireland on a basis of equality and mutual respect. Instead, the British ruling class chose violence and conflict. That the Irish people did not want British rule was confirmed by the results of the municipal and urban elections which were held throughout Ireland in January 1920. In advance of these elections the British Government had introduced, for Ireland only, the proportional representative (PR) system of voting in an attempt to weaken the Sinn Féin vote. Although PR voting was introduced for the purpose of undermining its vote, Sinn Féin actually came out in support of it on principle as a more equitable method of voting. As historian Dorothy Macardle put it, the "result of the election was a vote of confidence in the Republican Government such as no British Government ever received from the electorate of the United Kingdom."
Even in the Six Counties area which the Unionists were to claim wanted nothing to do with an Irish Republic, two counties, Fermanagh and Tyrone, voted in a majority for Sinn Féin. In Derry, the Unionists were proved to be a minority. In the nine counties that made up Ulster, 23 towns had elected a majority of Republicans, 22 a Unionist majority. The idea of a homogeneous "Unionist Ulster" was therefore exposed as a canard for any who wished to see it.
The British, however, ignored the democratic wishes of the Irish people as expressed in the January 1920 vote just as they had the General Election vote of 1918. The British Government made clear what path it was choosing when shortly afterwards it brought over the infamous Black and Tans and Auxiliary units to "police" Ireland and to impose British rule. Irish-elected Irish officials were put under threat. The Republican Mayor of Limerick, Michael O'Callaghan, was shot; the Mayor of Cork, Terence MacSwiney, was captured and then, when the British refused to release him, he went on hunger strike and died. The British imposed martial law throughout much of Ireland, censored newspapers, and curtailed basic civil liberties. All of this was done, of course, without the consent of the Irish people.
In May 1921, elections were held in Ireland in the wake of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, the Act which partitioned Ireland according to British law. The Irish naturally did not accept the right of the British to carve up their country but did use the opportunity as a way of holding elections for the Second Dáil. This presented advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it was seen as a powerful opportunity to counter British propaganda and to shore up support for the separatist position. From the start of the Tan War the British had maintained that Ireland was in the grip of fanatical gunmen who ruled not by consent of the Irish but through fear. It was the British Government that was truly concerned for the well-being of the Irish and trying to protect them from these unrepresentative extremists. However, Sinn Féin won another overwhelming electoral victory in the May elections and so dashed British hopes of effectuating a separation between the Irish populace and the Sinn Féin leadership. As intended, Unionists won the majority of seats in the newly created British entity known as Northern Ireland. There is a question, therefore, about the use of the British electoral machinery.
The Irish, in fact, not only used the British electoral machinery, they also maintained a British parliamentary system of government. They did not, for example, set up an American-style system with clear separation of powers. Most of the Dáil members were Dublin centered and they did not seek to set up a federal-style republic that might have divided power into county and province levels. One TDE, Alec McCabe of Sligo, did propose a commission to look into the feasibility of a scheme of federalized government, but nothing came of it. The Irish also did not set up a Constitution (other than a procedural one for the Dáil) or a Bill of Rights. Perhaps if a clearer institutional break had been made from the British model, it would have been easier to affect a separation. It does not appear, however, that much thought was given at the time to alternatives to the British parliamentary model. In any event, as the Irish were in the middle of a hard-fought war, they had little time to spend on these long-term considerations.
Despite the clear rejection of British rule by the voters of Ireland, Britain never doubted its own right to dictate terms and conditions to the Irish people. This was certainly the case with the “Treaty” (actually Articles of Agreement) that the British insisted the Irish sign to end the Tan War. The Treaty usurped Irish sovereignty and forced the Irish to accept British partition of Ireland. Lloyd George threatened that if the Irish representatives did not sign then they would be faced with “immediate and terrible war” by Britain on the Irish people.
As far as the British were concerned, moreover, partition was already a fait accompli. Partition, it must be remembered, did not come about with the signing of the Articles of Agreement in December 1921 or its passage in Dáil Éireann in January 1922. Partition came into being, as far as the British were concerned, with the passage of the Government of Ireland Act in the British Parliament in December 1920. The Ulster Unionists actually voted against the Act and Nationalists were already operating in Dáil Éireann and did not attend Westminster. The partition of Ireland, therefore, was accomplished by Britain, without the votes or consent of the Irish. That is how partition came to Ireland.
From the British point of view, those elected outside of the Six Counties in May 1921 under the 1920 Act were members of the Parliament of Southern Ireland. It was this body, and not the Dáil, that the British recognized. For example, the Dáil had approved the Articles of Agreement on January 7, 1922. This, however, was not sufficient for the British. The Parliament of Southern Ireland met on January 14th to approve the Treaty and elect a Provisional Government. This Parliament, of course, excluded Nationalists from the Six Counties and Republicans did not recognize this body. The British decided on partition and then required that the Irish "approve" the Treaty in a body that the British, not the Irish, had established. Although the Pro-Treaty forces in Ireland tried to hold onto the illusion that the Dáil was still functioning, it was clear that it was to this British-created entity and not Dáil Éireann that the British were handing over the limited powers provided for in the Agreement. Eventually the Pro-Treaty forces gave up this fiction and abandoned Dáil Éireann and the All Ireland Republic and set up the Free State Government with the restrictions on sovereignty and jurisdiction imposed on it by the British Government.
During the Civil War that followed the Treaty, the Dáil was shunted aside by military men on both sides. Both did so while accusing the other of being undemocratic. In March 1922 Rory O'Connor, speaking for the Anti-Treaty Army Executive, repudiated the Dáil. O'Connor was asked at a press conference if this meant that "we are going to have a military dictatorship then?" O'Connor infamously replied, "You can take it that way if you like." In addition, pro-Treaty meetings were regularly disrupted, something that De Valera did at least object to in an appeal to respect the rights of free speech.
The Free State Government, for its part, gave the Free State Army almost carte blanche in dealing with Republicans. Military courts were established with power to impose the death penalty for offenses such as unauthorized possession of weapons. This was the charge that led to the execution by the Free State of leading Republican publicist Erskine Childers on November 24, 1922. Shortly thereafter, four leading 
Republican prisoners, one from each province, were executed by the Free State as reprisal for the assassination of a Free State politician that had occurred while all four Republicans were already in prison. These infamous "Mountjoy executions" by the Free State forces did not even have the pretense of legality. Some like Cathal O'Shannon of the Labor Party denounced militarism on both sides. "The military spirit is as deep in one section of the Army as it is in another, and the reason is that both came with prestige out of the guerilla warfare against England..." As for a Six County government created by British fiat, in March 1922 it had introduced a Special Powers Bill by which trial by jury could be superseded, inquests abolished, and flogging and the death penalty inflicted for the possession of arms, while Nationalist civilians in the Six Counties were subject to acts of state violence. Britain, of course, had long maintained repressive legislation in Ireland and, as often happens in history, those in power are quick to use war or a national emergency, real or otherwise, as a pretext to undermine liberties.
It wasn't until October 1922, after the Civil War was already underway, that the I.R.A. Army Executive declared itself willing to give allegiance to a reconstituted Republican Government under the presidency of 
De Valera. The Republican members of the Second Dáil met in Dublin in October 1922 and called upon De Valera to resume the presidency. De Valera nominated Austin Stack as Minister of Finance, P.J. Ruttledge was put in charge of Home Affairs, and Liam Mellows was named as Minister of Defense (Mellows was in prison, shortly to be one of those extrajudicially killed in Mountjoy Jail). The restoration of the Republican Government was an important and necessary step, but it had been delayed to the point at which it was clear that the Free Staters were going to win militarily in the Civil War. For their part, those Dáil members who remained faithful to the Republic attempted to carry on as the de jure Government of Ireland even after the military defeat of the Anti-Treatyites.
However, in November 1925, prompted by Donegal I.R.A. leader Peadar O Donnell, the I.R.A. withdrew its support for the Republican Dáil Government on the pretext that the Republican Government had "developed into a mere political party." The move weakened the Republican Movement with no discernible offsetting benefits. Ironically it was O Donnell himself who later went on to found a political party, Saor Éire. The move led to a further split within the Republican Movement and the radical platform of Saor Éire garnered little popular support and the group itself would be short lived. After the withdrawal of support by the I.R.A., the Republican Dáil then had to face the challenge caused by the defections by De Valera and his supporters who were intent on entering into the Free State Parliament as the newly created Fianna Fáil party. The faithful members of the Second Dáil would not consider recognizing the Free State Parliament; those such as O Donnell who questioned the steadfastness of the Second Dáil were proven wrong.
It was also at this time, November 1925, that it was announced that the British-controlled Boundary Commission was refusing to make any adjustments to the Border to take into account the democratic wishes of the Nationalists in the Six Counties. It had been promised during the Treaty debates that the Boundary Commission would determine final boundaries in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. Indeed, those who signed the Treaty on the Irish side had been assured that the results of the Commission would be such that it would be impossible for partition to be maintained given the sizable Nationalist population within Northern Ireland. The perfidy of the British was thus exposed as well as the reality that partition would not be a short-lived phenomenon as many Treaty supporters had argued to the Irish people. The announcement by the British-controlled Boundary Commission was thus a capstone on the tragedy and disappointment faced by the Irish people from the time the Treaty was signed.
Unsurprisingly there was much recrimination as to who was to blame for leading Ireland into a bloody and destructive Civil War and for the failure to deal with the boundary issue. For generations now, the focus has been on the Irish themselves: their missteps taken during the Treaty negotiations and the Civil War. People have focused on arguments about the Treaty and have asked why De Valera didn't join the Irish delegation to London, or why Collins didn't consult with Dublin before signing, etc. The matter quickly turns into a debate over who on the Irish side was responsible for losing the Republic or who was responsible for the Civil War. Who, in other words, on the Irish side should be counted the villain.
Obviously, those on both sides of these debates in Ireland were responsible for the decisions and mistakes they made. These arguments, however, skip over a fundamental point. These agonizing choices among the Irish would not have been necessary if the wishes of the Irish people for an independent state had been respected. First and foremost, the responsibility for the Civil War rests with those who refused to recognize the democratic will of the Irish people for independence. It rests, in other words, with the British Government. There has, however, been almost no discussion of the responsibility of the British Government in bringing about the Irish Civil War. Evidence of British responsibility, however, is there to be seen.
Although British Prime Minister Lloyd George claimed that the Irish had only two choices, sign the Agreement or face "immediate and terrible war," there was, in fact, a third choice. The British could have abided by basic democratic principles and allowed Irish self-determination. Even De Valera's compromise idea of external association, however, was rejected out of hand by the British. The Irish were willing to grant Ulster a great degree of self-rule within a united Ireland context. A federal solution, then, as now, offered a real opportunity for a just and fair resolution of the conflict. The British, however, had no interest in ensuring that the civil and religious rights of the unionist population would be protected by an Irish government. They also had no interest in encouraging local autonomy for Ulster if it was within an all-Ireland context. The British were interested not in the long term well- being of the unionist population, but rather in continuing to exert sovereignty in Ireland and Britain was determined to use the threat of force to impose their continued presence on the Irish people.
The majority of Irish people, of course, had through democratic vote repeatedly and overwhelmingly indicated their support for a unified independent Republic. They did everything required under democratic norms to establish their right to sovereign independence. It is hard to see what more they could have done. When it came to Ireland, however, Britain did not respect democratic norms. The British required the Irish to turn their back on the Republic and swear an oath of allegiance to the British Crown. Much has been made of the alleged intransigence of Irish Republicans in refusing to accept such an oath. Almost nothing is said of the mind-set of the British who would extort allegiance from an unwilling people by threat of war and violence. If the oath was simply meaningless “symbolism,” why were the British prepared to return to war against the Irish if the Irish did not accept it? Certainly, very few Irish people wanted to swear an oath to the British Crown, but the democratic wishes of the Irish people carried little weight with the British Government, who demanded loyalty by coercion. As with the oath, partition was also imposed on Ireland against the wishes of the majority of the Irish people.
Those in Ireland who insisted on standing by the Republic, democratically established by the Irish people, are deemed wild-eyed militarists, extremists, dead-enders. The British leaders who were willing to bring about "immediate and terrible war" against the Irish people and who saw a bloody Irish Civil War as a more desirable outcome than a democratic Republic in Ireland, rarely if ever have their motives and outlooks challenged by revisionist historians. However, the sense of entitlement by the British political class when it came to Ireland was extraordinary. First, they disregarded the democratic will of the Irish people for complete independence and then they set up a political entity on Irish soil in violation of all democratic norms.
Given this historical legacy, it is remarkable that the British Government has managed for decades to justify its backing of the Six County entity as some sort of commitment to the values of democracy or majority rule. Unionists were a political minority in Ireland. In fact, you cannot create a Unionist majority in the northeast until you have first decided to disregard the wishes of the majority of the population for a united Ireland.
Partition was also not, as some revisionist commentators have claimed, an inevitable consequence of the "divided nature of Ireland." In the first place it should be kept in mind that the notion that Ireland needed to be divided was only raised after the possibility of Irish self-rule came into view. The people of Ireland, moreover, were certainly not evenly divided on partition; the overwhelming majority was opposed to it. To the extent that Ireland, like other nations, did have divisions, that only meant that someone would be in political minority. It did not mean inevitably that it had to be the Nationalists of six of the northeast counties that would be that minority. That was a decision made by the British and imposed on the Irish people as a whole. It certainly was not an outcome that followed democratic norms.
Following democratic norms, those who constituted a political minority on the island of Ireland, Unionists, would be the political minority in an Irish state. As historian Donnacha Ó Beacháin summarized, “[n]ot only was the concept of partition inherently undemocratic, considering that 80 per cent of the Irish population favored independence from Britain, but its execution compounded the iniquity.” “To satisfy the demands of a small regional majority and to preserve British hegemony, a new state was established, ostensibly to protect a 20 per cent minority while simultaneously creating a new minority that made up 34 per cent of the [Six County] population.” As Irish historian Joe Lee has pointed out, Britain and their Unionist allies saw no incongruity in denying Dáil Éireann the right to govern the whole country in spite of the overwhelming Nationalist majority in Ireland as a whole, while insisting on a Unionist right to rule the territory of Northern Ireland based on a much smaller Unionist majority in four out of the nine counties of historic Ulster. Ulster, of course, consists of nine counties, not six. Historic Ulster, however, contained too many Nationalists to allow for Unionist domination and so Northern Ireland was made up of six counties and not nine. But of course, if the question of national self-determination is not to be made on a national level or even on a provincial level but on a county-by-county basis, there are majority Nationalist populations in two of Northern Ireland's six counties: Fermanagh and Tyrone. Britain made clear, however, that it would not let individual counties opt out of their Northern Ireland statelet. In fact, when the Fermanagh County Council attempted to affiliate with Dublin after the Treaty, the British Government responded by dissolving the Fermanagh County Council. Clearly the “principle of consent,” a phrase so often invoked by apologists for the partitionist status quo, did not apply to the people living in majority Nationalist counties who were forced, without their consent, into a British-created entity called Northern Ireland.
The question is why the “principle of consent” did not apply to these Nationalist counties? Why was it deemed acceptable to force the people of Fermanagh and Tyrone to become a political minority, against their wishes, within a British state, but unacceptable for people in Antrim and Down to become a political minority within an Irish state? If partition cannot be justified by normal democratic principles, what was the real rationale behind it? To answer that question, it is necessary to look at what British elite opinion thought of the idea that Ireland should be governed by the normal democratic principle of majority rule. Here is a revealing quote from a pro-British newspaper that gives much insight into British thinking about the Irish capacity for self-government:
“Can a people still in the nursery, mentally and morally, be allowed to govern itself, either in much or in little?”
The Irish Times, March 20, 1920
The Irish, in other words, were only children, not able to govern themselves, and certainly not fit to govern the Unionist political minority within Ireland. Here laid bare is the underlying belief in Irish inferiority that helps explain the British contempt for the democratic will of the Irish people. This is what led the British to oppose any outcome that would bring the minority Unionist population under Irish jurisdiction. The Irish people of course are no better or worse than anyone else; they simply have the same right as the British, or any other people, to govern their own country. The unwillingness of the British and the Unionists to accept this can be seen as a manifestation of the general colonialist attitude of superiority over “native” populations. This colonial attitude has certainly not been confined to Ireland. In its most extreme and virulent form, the South African government created “Bantustans” as a way of artificially creating a pro-apartheid white demographic majority in a country that was overwhelmingly nonwhite and antiapartheid. Israel has denied equal voting and other rights to Palestinians while still claiming jurisdiction over Palestinian land.
As we have already seen, Britain certainly could not claim the right to rule based on normal democratic criteria. And certainly, Britain could not claim the right to continue to interfere in Ireland based on its past track record of rule in Ireland. Nor could it be credibly claimed that partition would “solve” any of I
reland’s problems, including the problem of sectarianism. The division of Ireland into two separate political entities via partition in fact exacerbated sectarianism on both sides of the British-created border. True, principled, Republicanism rejects sectarianism and any attempt to divide the Irish people on ethnic or religious grounds. Many of the leading lights of Irish Republicanism---such as Wolfe Tone, Robert Emmett, Alice Milligan, and Bulmer Hobson---were Protestant, and nonsectarianism has always been a stated principle of the movement. This was the founding spirit of the United Irishman and it was carried forward by the Young Ireland leaders such as William Smith O Brien, and Charles Gavan Duffy and then by the Fenians, whose Proclamation to the Irish people of March 1867 declared “in favor of absolute liberty of conscience, and complete separation of Church and State.”
In 1919, therefore, Republicans had invited all representatives, Unionist and Nationalists alike, to the First Dáil Éireann and attracted and welcomed the support and invaluable talents of Irish Protestants such as Robert Barton, Erskine Childers, and Dr. Kathleen Lynn. With Partition, the potential for a nonsectarian f
uture was undermined. In the 26 Counties, the Free State disregarded the principles of Republicanism by setting up a confessional State, giving preferential status to the Roman Catholic Church. At the behest of the Catholic Church the Free State imposed rigorous censorship and prohibited divorce. Individuals of other faiths could find themselves unfairly targeted. There was, to cite just one infamous example, the case of a woman, Letitia Dunbar-Harrison, who was forced out of her job of Mayo County librarian because she was Protestant. Incidents such as these, of course, made the prospect of a united Ireland decidedly unappetizing to the Unionist population in the Six Counties. As for the northeast of the country, the Unionists in the Six Counties of course had no nonsectarian principles to betray and the British Government was content to let them set up an explicitly sectarian state under British jurisdiction. The idea that establishing such a sectarian state would reduce sectarian tensions was, of course, absurd.
Along with its sectarianism, the Six County statelet set up by the British also gave the Irish people internment without trial, torture of political prisoners, censorship, and repressive legislation. In short, partition was, from a human rights and civil liberties standpoints, a disaster. In terms of the economic consequences of partition, a detailed study has been done by economic consultant Michael Burke. As he states in “The Economic Case for Irish Unity,” “no one charged solely with the creation of the optimal economic entity on the island of Ireland would dream of separating the northeast corner from the rest of the country, and imposing two different currencies, legal and tax frameworks and two different legislatures either side of that border.” The truncated Irish rail system is one concrete example of the damage partition made to Ireland’s infrastructure. The British vote in favor of “Brexit,” i.e. the removal of Britain from the European Union, shows that significant restrictions on the right of the Irish people to travel freely from one part of their own country to another can still be threatened by actions of the British Government. The Irish people will be unable to stop this threat from hanging over Ireland as long as they accept the right of Britain to partition their nation into two separate jurisdictions.
Contrary to popular understanding, therefore, the 1998 Stormont/Good Friday Agreement (GFA) did not resolve the fundamental problems related to British involvement in Ireland. In terms of the GFA it is important to remember that it was not an all -Ireland referendum on the question of unity. In fact, the votes of the majority of the Irish people, those living in the 26 Counties, were specifically excluded from having any effect on the question of partition. Contemporary polls showed in fact that even with decades of revisionist political and media dominance, a substantial majority of the Irish people as a whole still supported Irish unity. That option, however, was never put to Irish voters. Now, over twenty years on, British restrictions over full Irish self-determination remain in place, and the consequences are still being felt.
The difficulties caused in Ireland by the British vote on Brexit are just the latest and most visible example. But every day Nationalists throughout the Six Counties are forced to pay taxes to support the very British military, police, and intelligence forces that are violating their rights and working against their interests. Take, for example, the secretive British GCHQ, the rough equivalent to the American NSA. The Guardian has reported in the past that GCHQ has a special unit to spy on those living in Northern Ireland and has the capacity to bug every mobile and landline phone there. In fact, the international human rights group Amnesty International had a long battle in order to uncover the fact that even members of the “devolved assemblies,” including members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, are targets of electronic spying by GCHQ. In what should have been a shocking revelation, but which only received scant publicity, it turns out that GCHQ was also spying on Amnesty International itself. The British Government never told the truth about its spying on a human rights organization itself; the information had to be forced out. The Guardian has also reported that it appears that GCHQ has been bugging Irish citizens within the 26 Counties. When it comes to invading the privacy of Irish people, the British security apparatus does, it seems, take an “all-Ireland” approach. Within the Six Counties, Irish citizens remain subject to harsh and repressive “security” laws and measures. Young Nationalists, for example, are constantly subjected to stop-and-search and other manner of harassment by the British security forces. Also currently in place is what is known as “Internment by Remand” in which individuals are denied bail while awaiting trial, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence.
Partition is also what enables Unionists to restrict or delay an Irish Language Act despite the specific call for an Irish Language Act in the Saint Andrews Agreement of 2006. Unionist hostility to the Irish language has been well established. Whatever the eventual outcome, the question should remain as to why a political minority in Ireland would have the power to refuse to provide for the national language. Clearly the system forced on the Irish people by the British was not designed for the best interests of the Irish people and is not, in fact, serving the interests of the Irish people as a whole. A different system is needed.
What is needed is an inclusive, nonsectarian Ireland based on the principles and spirit of the United Irishmen and women with guarantees of equal rights and liberties for all its men and women, regardless of background. Structures would have to be put in place to ensure that these rights and liberties were protected. The idea is not to simply incorporate the Six Counties into the existing 26 County State. A New Ireland, agreed by the people of Ireland themselves, would have to be built. This New Ireland would include a Charter of Rights, separation of Church and State, and a truly independent Judiciary. A federal system, based on the historic provinces (with Ulster’s nine counties) would ensure that all sections of the Irish people, including Unionists, would have input at the county, provincial, and national level, as to how they were to be governed. This must be done by the Irish people themselves, without British interference.
For some time now, the British and their apologists have managed effectively to push any discussion of the undemocratic foundations of Northern Ireland out of mainstream discourse. This history, however, must be brought to the forefront because the legacy, as we can see, remains.
Had the British accepted the democratic wishes of the Irish people, there would have been no partition, no Irish Civil War, and no Northern Ireland. The reality that partition was imposed on Ireland against the democratic wishes of the Irish people, and that it was based on conceptions of Irish inferiority, does not change with the passage of time. The question is whether or not the Irish people wish to accept a political entity that was founded as a negation of the democratic will of the Irish people and premised on ideas of Irish inferiority. If the mind-set behind partition is discredited, why should partition itself remain in place?
The people of Ireland should have the right to decide if partition serves their interests. Certainly, there do not seem to be many positive benefits of partition. Nobody seems to be able to offer up any positive good that the decades of partition have brought to the Irish people. It is notable, in fact, that defenders of partition are seldom even asked to come up with any positive justification for their position. But if partition was premised on ideas of Irish inferiority and provides no benefit to Ireland, why should the Irish people feel obliged to respect and maintain it?
A method of moving away from this failed system must be adopted. The people from all 32 counties comprising all four provinces that make up Ireland should vote together as one national unit. The votes from people from Cork and Antrim, Derry and Dublin, should all count equally. Britain should no longer be allowed to control who votes in any referendum on Ireland’s future, let alone be able to veto the outcome of any all-Ireland vote.
Any proposed “Border Poll” limited to the Six Counties is not an exercise in true Irish self-determination. The term “Border Poll” is itself misleading, as it makes it seem as though it is a poll about whether or not the Border should remain. Actually, what it means is a poll that is restricted to people inside the British-created border of Northern Ireland, thereby excluding the majority of Irish people who live in the rest of Ireland. In a Border Poll the votes of people from Cavan, or Kerry, or Dublin would not count. Any outcome in the rest of Ireland, no matter how overwhelmingly in favor of reunification it might be, would do nothing to change British rule in the Six Counties under this type of Border Poll.
We can already see, moreover, that the unionists, backed by the British, will change the goalposts if there is any chance of a nationalist majority emerging within the Six Counties itself. Unionists have begun demanding that even a majority for unity within the Six Counties be deemed insufficient to end partition. The British can be expected to back up this unionist insistence that only a Six County "supermajority" can alter the statelet that the British established under anti-majority principles. History seems to be repeating itself. Still it is remarkable to see those who have spoken for decades in sanctimonious tones about the right of the majority within the British created Northern Ireland to decide its future now changing their tune. Majority rule never seems to come into play when it involves the nationalist population of Ireland. There is simply no reason for the people of Ireland to continue to play along with this game when it is clear that the rules will continue to be changed in order to prop up an entity, Northern Ireland, that was created against the democratic wishes of the majority of the Irish people. A Border Poll confined to the Six Counties is simply a way to disenfranchise the vast majority of the people of Ireland. This is why, current British posturing notwithstanding, the British do not really fear a partitionist Border Poll. In any true referendum on Irish reunification, the votes of all the people in Ireland would all count toward the total. Britain, of course, would never agree to accept any democratic all-Ireland decision without overwhelming pressure from the Irish people themselves.
The urgent job for Republicans, therefore, is to engage with and seek to persuade the majority of the people on the island of Ireland to stand in favor of Irish national self-determination. This is the only way that progress can be made. There are no shortcuts. Any strategy that does not have this goal at its center will not succeed. Any tactics that will alienate the majority of the Irish people from the cause of a united Ireland will only backfire. Highlighting to the Irish people the undemocratic nature and history of partition is a key part of any effective strategy. The more the focus can be put on the anomaly of partition, its absurdity, the way it insults basic concepts of equality and democracy, the more vulnerable it is to challenge.
Time, however, is of the essence. Britain has been very clever and effective in normalizing its presence in Ireland. Acceptance of partition is especially high among elite media and political circles within Ireland itself who have used their power and influence to spread their revisionist message. Republicans must be focused on effective strategies if they hope to stem this tide. The task is challenging but not impossible.
It is worth noting that many things that were until recently thought impossible are no longer so considered. Just a few short years ago, Scottish independence was a pipe-dream; now it is much more of a real possibility and can serve as a model for Ireland. The people of Scotland, for example, have established, via the Edinburgh Agreement of 2012, that the question of independence will be determined by vote of the majority of the people of Scotland voting as a national unit. No supermajority is required, and England does not get to create a separate “pro-Unionist” entity in the southern part of Scotland, for example, if Scotland does vote for independence. Why, if these basic principles have been applied to Scotland, should they not apply to Ireland? And with the vote by Britain to leave the European Union, Scotland may yet have a successful independence vote. There is no reason why Ireland should not follow Scotland’s example. As for the possibility of Britain leaving the European Union, that too was once deemed far-fetched, and then the Brexit vote occurred. Predictably, the EU responded hostilely to a vote that demonstrated discontent with the far-reaching power of the EU. Britain at least got the opportunity to vote on whether remaining in the EU served its interests, even as Britain refuses to allow the Irish people as a whole to vote on partition.
The Irish, of course, also had the experience of how the EU reacts to a democratic referendum when, in 2008, the (26 County) Irish electorate rejected a Lisbon Treaty that many felt signaled a more centralized, more militarized, and less democratic European state. Rather than respecting the electoral outcome, however, many 26 County politicians (and many European ones as well) simply said that the Irish would have to have to "do over" the election, until they got it "right" (i.e. approve the Lisbon Treaty). The EU has, predictably, also shown hostility to the movement for Catalan independence. The 2017 Catalan referendum on independence, however, can also serve as an important role model for Ireland. The supporters of Catalan independence went out, at some personal risk, to vote in a referendum. The images broadcast around the world of the Spanish security forces violently attacking the people of Catalan who were engaged in the simple act of voting certainly clarified the issues at stake and very likely strengthened the independence movement as nothing else could do. There are certainly lessons for Ireland in terms of strategy and tactics from the Catalan independence movement. The question is whether the people of Ireland would be willing to follow the example of the people of Catalan who used a referendum vote on independence as a way of both demonstrating and building support for Catalan independence. There is also a question of how the British Government would respond to such a situation. Would the British Government respond to a truly national referendum on Irish unity as did the Spanish Government, with violence and repression, thus showing the true nature of British "democracy" in Ireland? That, of course, is how Britain responded to the exercise of Irish self-determination in the General Election of 1918. That, however, would be a high-risk strategy for the British to try now and would put the spotlight on the historical reality of British interference in Irish democracy. Without a visible mobilization of the majority of the Irish people, however, the British Government will never be put to the test.
This, of course, is a time of commemorations in Irish history. The year 2016 marked the 100th anniversary of the Easter Rising of 1916. Much has been rightly made of the stirring invocation in the 1916 Proclamation of the rights of Irish women as well as Irish men, of the Proclamation’s guarantees of religious and civil liberty, equal rights for all its citizens, and of “cherishing all the children of the nation equally” in contrast to the historic use by the British Government of ethnic or religious divisions to advance its own ends. True Republicans remain committed to the Proclamation’s call for equality and inclusiveness for all the people of Ireland. Many Irish people in the 26 Counties have expressed their outrage at what they see as attacks on ethnic and religious minorities, as well as on women, coming from the current U.S. Administration. That concern, however, should extend to those ethnic and religious minorities living within Northern Ireland. Perhaps now is the time to persuade the people of the 26 Counties to no longer turn a blind eye to what is happening in the northeast of their own country. It is a problem for the people of the whole of Ireland to address together. Just as Irish America should be consistent when they criticize the bigotry and human rights abuses in the northeast of Ireland by not remaining silent to it at home, so too people in Ireland should be concerned about equality and human rights not just in America or elsewhere overseas, but also in the northeast of Ireland itself. We must be consistent in these matters in order to both maintain our credibility and to honor our history.
The 1916 Proclamation guaranteed that the Republic would pursue “the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts.” It also called for a “permanent National Government representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women.” The commitment of t
he signatories to the Proclamation to an All Ireland Republic, therefore, is unmistakable. Not coincidently, it is these sections of the Proclamation that are usually left unaddressed by many of those who pay only lip service tribute to the ideals of the Proclamation. By doing so they hope to obscure the fact that British-imposed partition was anathema to the vision of the men and women of 1916 as evidenced by the words of the Proclamation itself. Other important anniversaries can provide inspiration. The year 2018 marks the 100th anniversary of the Anti-Conscription Campaign in Ireland, a successful campaign to oppose any attempt by Britain to conscript (draft) Irish men into the British Army to serve as cannon fodder during the First World War. The Anti-Conscription Campaign was a mass broad-based movement that included militant Republicans such as Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack, as well as moderate Nationalists. It was an important campaign in its own right in that it helped to prevent unknown thousands of Irish young men from dying in England’s imperial war, but it also helped greatly to advance the national cause. It could serve as an important example for Irish people going forward from today.
The year 2018 also marks the 100th anniversary of the watershed General Election of November 1918, and the grant of (limited) franchise to women, who with the whole of the Irish people went to the polls and voted for their independence. And, of course, January 21, 2019 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the First All- Ireland Dáil Éireann, and the Declaration of Irish Independence. There is much work to be done to restore the All Ireland Republic that Irish men and women of a past generation sacrificed so much to establish. Now, therefore, is not the time for indifference or cynicism. It would be a fitting tribute to the memory of those Irish men and women who came before us to at least make the effort to reclaim what they sacrificed so much to establish---Irish national democracy.
The first necessary step for the Irish people is to make it clear that it is they themselves, and not the British Government, who get the last word on the future of the Irish nation. Only by a clear demonstration of the will of the Irish people to reject partition will change come. If the Irish people were successfully mobilized, we could well be on the path to making the 21st of January a true day of celebration.
First Dáıl Commemoration Committee
for more information contact at thefirstdail@gmail.com
